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Competition policy in the Community  104/75 
No  area of Community  policy has aroused so much  interest in academic and business 
circles as  competition policy.  A vast array of material by  journalists,  students 
and learned writers deals both with its theoretical basis and with its economic 
and legal implications. Responsibility for the competition policy lies with the 
Commission  of the European Communities.  It works  on  proposals  from its Direc-
torate-General for Competition,  and the authorities in the Member  States are 
closely involved.  The  European Court  of Justice,  which has  power to abrogate. 
administrative acts of the Commission,  and the national courts in the Member 
States·, which deal with the implications in civil law  of infringements of ·the 
Treaties,  also play·a major role.  Indeed it can be said without  e:taggeration 
that  competition policy has  alw~s been the keystone of the -Community's 
economic  policy.  This is no  mere  coincidence,  for the EEC  Treaty lays considerable 
emphasis  on  competition.  Innumerable  independent  decisions bybusi:rms and  consumer· 
determine  investment  and market  trends,  and  ~lthough the state can take direct 
economic action in individual industries, the economies  of all the Member  States 
work  on competitive lines. The  competition principle further underlies.the 
whole process of integration - of merging the individual national  economies  into 
a  single European economy.  The  free play of market  forces  rewards  efficiency 
arid  penalizes inefficiency. 
The  EEC  Treaty regards the institution and preservation of a  system of undistor-
ted competi  t.ion as  one  of the pillars of European integration. It is surely no 
coincidence that competition policy has  steadily grown  in stature despite the 
crises and turmoils which have beset the Community.  It is a  political factor 
directly affecting everybody involved in business and  commercial life. 
If firms  and individuals were not  given the legally backed assurance that they 
could buy and sell goods  and services in all the Member  States without 
discrimination,  there would be no  common  market.  Restrictive agreements  and 
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other practices would do the  job hitherto done by all those national harriers 
C'; 
to trade which we 'have worked so ·hard to diina.ntle.  Imports  of goods  in key  .. 
:industries :from other .Member .Stat.es would have been hindered llY  state-run mono-
polies  .•  ·.uncontrolled government assistance .would also have distorted the ·play 
of comp·etitj:on.. 
An  economy  can survive within -open  frontiers  .on~y if a  vigorous  and well-thought-
out  p·olicy ~ensures -:that  justi·ce reigns  in the .marketplace and :if there is a 
central :agency to enforce ·the rules of the game  .•  The ·Community ·competition policy 
provides the rules of 'the  game  and 'has  two  functions·:  first., ·it ensures that  a 
genuine European market  can come  into existence and  remain in existence;  second, 
it ensures that the :market process is fair to ·the  consumer.  Competition policy 
aims  to ensure that supply-and demand are evenly matched and forces firms to aim 
.. for that type .of technical :and ;economic ;progr.ess .without which ·the <continuous 
improvement ·of the .l:i:vi'ng ;and :working conditions ·Of ·Community rcit·iz:ens .i:s 
.unth:i:nka;bl e. 
I 
European competition 1poli:cy does •not  just •consist of a  ·seri·es •Of  prohibitions  • 
.  It actively promotes cooperation between firms  as a  :means  o'f 'bettering performance. 
Nor does it impose a  'blanket prohibition on state assistance. Assistance which is 
in line with Community interests and is necessary for structural purposes is 
,perfectly  co~qpatible with the _principle of fair competition in the  common  market; 
indeed, it .is ;necessary means  of :promot.ing the :harmoni·ous .development ·of •economic 
life ·throughout  the .  .Qommuni:t;y. • 
.Industry as a  whole is benefi  tihg l:ly  the .wider (!ppor:tunit.ies for buying and :seUing 
in the ·common :market.  As  a :result, ·the range of :goods ;available has ·been broadened 
and the .consumer is better·supplied.  Where price ·differences continu:e ·to ·exist, 
·this is not  always .because the law ·on  competi  tivn is being broken. Dif:f.erences 
.in value  added tax, trade structures and Member.States'  price and  counterinflation 
policies often account for price differences. 
If Commission inquiries establish that price differences are the result of 
restrictive agreements  or of continued endeavours  by a  ·dominant ·firm to preserve 
the artificial .segregation .of national markets for its own -strategic •ends:,  ,a 
decision is formally adqpted and ·sent ·direct tto  the -t:>ff.ending .firms., .requiring 
them to ·desist  .•.  Heavy .fines ·can be :imposed for :intentional or -negli•gent ·infringe-1. 
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ments  of Community competition law.  The  fine  can be  a  most  impressive deterrent, 
for· i:t  can  run. to as. much.  as, 10  %.  of the culprit.  1 s. annual sales. Fines. have 
risen on occasion. to. more. than· a. million. do1la:rs •. 
The  Commission cracks  down particu:larly hard. on. anticompeti  ti  ve- pract.ices. which 
are likely· to· impair the• unity  ..  of the! market.  These: practi.cea are. desigp:ed to 
give· manufacturers. territorial prot:ect±.on in their· own  domestic: aubmarkets, 
and. by splitting· the! common. market· up·  they can pUT.sue:.sales  and pricing· policies 
which are: shiel.ded from. competition from· other manufacturers! of: the. same  goods. 
The  consumer· is: harmed. by.  this:,. as he  is. also by fixed:  supply.- quotas!.  Whe~ 
firms  enter into· a~eements· whereby they· refrain. from. competing with. each other, 
it. is. the· consumer who  has to pay the- bill  .•.  The  prohibition. in Article: 85  of 
of.' the  EEC~ Treaty makes  no distinction between restrictive· agreements  and 
concerted practices:,. but  extends: equally to any form·  of· cooperati.on between 
firms which restrains the free play of competition or·reduces· uncertainty as 
to what  competitors are doing;.  What.  matters. is whether the effects· are felt 
within the  common. market  and whether the· anticompetiti  ve practices may  affect 
trade: between Member  States:. 
It would be, going, too far to· try and. establish a. watertight definition of the 
type: of· ant.icomp.etitiv:e pract.ice which. may· affect trade between states. A few· 
examples  must  suffice  •.  In. the past there were: a  number of reciprocal collective 
exclusive dealing agreements  in Belgium and. the· Netherlands.  A group  of manu-
facturers  in a  given countr.y would agree with the most  influential group  of 
dealers in the  same•  country on an_ exclusive dealing arrangement  whereby dealers 
would handle· only domesti.c: goods  •.  At  the ·same  time the manufacturers would 
agree not to supply outsiders.  The  effect of this was  to segregate markets  on 
national lines, for the trade in the relevant. country could no.  longer handle 
products  from  other· Member  States: and buyers  from dealers  could no  longer choose 
from the full  rang~: of products  availabl:.e! in the· Common  Market.  The  establishment 
of minimum  purchasing quotas. in favour· of domestic goods is another· means  of 
providing a  partial shield against the pressure of competition.  Again,.  customers 
derive considerab'l:e benefit· from· the grant: of aggregated rebates,  where the 
amoun·'.;  allowed by the manufacturer depends  on the  customer•·s· total turnover 
during. the reference period, generally one year,  on goods  purchased from ali 
the manufacturers- who  are· party to· the agreement •.  Since the rebate is:  aggr~g;:~.ted, 
the. customer has. a  st-rong· incentive· to push it up  as high as•  possible by 
concentrating his. sales busines.s  on goods  produced by the relevant manufacturers. - 4-
He  will prefer not to buy from  other sources for this would  cut his aggregate 
rabate.  This  can still be an attractive propositio,n even when  outsider 
supplies are taken into account. 
Some  collective exclusive dealing arrangements  are in practice highly developed 
cartels which  can have  a  direct effect on prices. A typical  example  is the· 
cartel prohibited by the Commission  in 1973  which  organized sales of 22  LR 
calibre sporting ammunition  and  cartridges in the Netherlands.  The  manufac-
turers'  side comprised all the world's major ammunition manufacturers  and 
the export  agencies  of the Eastern European countries, while 90 %  of the 
Dutch  arms  dealers were  included on  the dealers'  side. 
A classic restrictive practice is the price-fixing agreement,  and the Commis-
sion has  frequently imposed heavy fines  on  offending firms  here.  Noteworthy 
cases have  involved quinine,  dyestuffs and sugar manufacturers.  Agree~ents 
on participation at fairs and exhibitions  can also have protectionist effects. 
For instance,  the Commission has taken action on  an agreement  whereby 
'national'  exhibitions were  open  only to such firms  as were headquartered in 
the organizing country or at least had some  kind of permanent  establishment 
or sales agency there. A particularly effective means  of'eliminating 
competition consists of working through a  joint sales agency.  A'whole  series 
of such agencies have already been prohibited by  ~he Commission,  notably for 
cement  and fertilizers. 
But  the prohibition in Article 85/1  does not  only catch horizontal agreements 
between competitors:  ve~ical agreements between manufacturers  and dealers 
whi9h restrict the business freedom  of one side or the other can also be 
damaging to competition.  A case here would  be the obligation for a  manufacturer 
to supply only a  single dealer in a  given part of the  common  market,  or an 
obligation on  a  dealer to obtain goods  of a  given type from  a  single manufac-
turer. Article 85/+  can also extend.to agreements  on  terms  of sale,  such as 
resale price maintenance and.other restrictions on the seller's.freedom. 
Unless  restrictions of this kind are in the interests of the  consumer,  they 
are prohibited,  but  pract.ices. which benefit the consumer  can satisfy the tests 
of Article 85/3  of the Treaty for exemption from  the prohibition in Article 85/1. 
Right  from  the start, the CommiE?sion's.  competition policy had to deal with the 
problem of exclusive dealing agreements.  The  agreement  between  G~dig  and its - 5 -
French sole distributor Consten infringed Article 85/1  and did not  qualify for 
exemption since the parties gave  each other absolute territorial protection. 
Grundig equipment  could be sold in Fr~ce only by Consten;  no  other Grundig 
dealer could export to France.  The  Court  of Justice of the.European Communities 
upheld the  Commission's  decision prohibiting this arrangement,  and since then 
the  consumer in the  common  market  had had the fundamental  right to obtain goods 
from whatever part of the  common  market  suits him best without let or hindrance. 
Dealers,  too,  have the fundamental  freedom to sell their goods  anywhere  in the 
common  market.  All they can be forced to do  is to concentrate their sales 0fforts 
primarily on that area of the  common  market which is their allottel territory. 
By  forcing a  partial dismantling of the exclusive dealing system,  the Commission 
has  broken down  some  of the barriers to trade between Member  States. As  soon as 
prices for a  given product  vary substantially from  one Member  State to another, 
there is automatically an  incentive for buyers  in high-price areas to obtain 
goods  from  low-price areas.  This  leads to parallel imports,  in other words 
imports  through channels other than the manufacturer's official network.  Parallel 
imports are an ever,Yday  phenomenon  in a  number  of instances,  such as motor cars 
and  gramophone  records. It is interesting to note that the  German  market,  where 
prices are  currently most  stable, is not necessarily the market  on which prices 
for all goods  are the lowest.  Thousands  of articles  can still be bought  more 
cheaply in other Member  States. Since there are estimated fifty thousand or more 
exclusive dealing agreements  operating in the  common  market,  it is clear that 
by easing the strictures of the exclusive dealing system we  can·help to put 
downward  pressure  on  prices. 
It goes without  saying that  export  bans  in conditions  of sale are  incompatible 
with the rules of competition.  Selective distribution system- where  the number. 
of dealers  is artificially kept  down  - are acceptable only if it is in the 
consumer's  interests that the number  of suppliers  should be  restricted,  as  has 
been found to be the case in the motor trade,  for instance. 
Firms  regularly use patent  and  other industrial property rights as a  means  of 
prese~ing the segregation of national markets.  With the support  of the European 
Court  of Justice,  the Commission has  taken firm action on practices whose  aim 
is not to protect the essence of the property right·but rather to exploit the 
fact that it is still a national'  right  in order to set up artificial barriers 
within the  common  market.  When  taking a  decision on restraints of competition - 6-
in licensing agreements,  the  Commission  has to make  sure that the parties are 
subjected to a  minimum  of restrictions on their freedom while at the  same  time 
ensuring that patentholders still have  incentive enough to make  technological 
advances  available to other firms  under under licence. In other words,.  the 
Commission  must  take especial care that the sources of licences do  not dry up. 
There are so many  types  of case where  the Commission has  promoted positive 
forms  of cooperation between firms  by giving exemption from the prohibitions 
that  a  few  examples will again have to suffice. Specialization agreements  and 
joint R & D agreemenis  spring immediately to mind.  Although  exemptions in respect 
of cooperation agreements are primarily designed to assist small  and medium 
businesses,  agreements  between large firms may  also qualify for exemption under 
Article 85/3.  By  way  of example,  a  joint R & D agreement  between Henkel  and 
Colgate was  allowed. 
A typical  example  of encouraged  cooperation was  the Transocean Marine Paint 
Association case.  The  Association combines  a  number  of  medium~sized firms which 
have built up a  joint worldwide  network for the sale of marine paints.  As  far 
as the buyer is concerned,  the result is that marine paints of similar qualities 
are available in a  large number  of countries;  the arrangements  have proved 
highly satisfactory. 
Since the prohibition in Article 85/1  applies to anticompetitive agreements 
whose  effects are felt within the  common  market,  it extends  even to firms whose 
headquarters are outside the Community. 
For some  years now,  the Commission has  been applying Article 86  of the EEC-Treaty, 
which prohibits the abuse  of dominant  positions,  alongside Article 85.  All  abuses 
are  prohi~ited without  exception;  instances of abusive  conduct  include imposing 
unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions,  limiting 
production,  sales or technical developments  to the prejudice of consumers,  and 
discriminatory treatment. 
One  important Article 86  decision was  issued against  GEMA,  a  performing rights 
society applying unfair terms  to composers,  while another concerned an American 
firm which refused to supply a  European customer. 
The  Commission's  view - upheld by the Court  of Justi.ce in·  Continental  Can  - is· 
that in certain circumstances  corporate mergers,  which  involve  changes  in market - 7 -
structure,  can also constitute abuse for purposes  of Article 86.  The  Commission 
considers that ·it is under an obligation to use Article 86  to  curb unhealthy 
changes  in the structure of business.  The  need for this arises from  the fact 
·that, ·once  they exceed a  certain degree  of market  power,  firms  are no  longer 
su:bject to control by market  forces ·and  can thus set their prices and  terms 
of sale in a  more  or less arbitrary fashion.  The  question to be asked in each 
case is whether the merger is in the interests only of the parties. to it or is 
beneficial to the economy  as  a  whole.  It is often beyond  the powers  of  judgment 
of the authorities to take a  decision on this,  since even those directly 
concerned, with the best will in the world,  cannot  always tell in advance 
whether a  merger will have beneficial ·effects.  The  Commission  prohibits.corporate 
·mergers ·that .will have demonstrably ·harmful  effects on  the economy.  An  example 
would be where,  as  a  result of the merger,  the consumer no  longer has any real 
scope for choice. 
By  ,prcihibiti·ng restrictive and  abusive practices,  Articles 85  and 86  can make 
a  modest  but nevertheless effective contribution to the fight  against inflation. 
It is very-difficult to quantify its share of the praise, but it is beyond dispute 
that consumer interests are constantly  safeguarded~by the  competition policy 
applied by the European Community. 
Competiti·On policy ·does  not  deal exclusively with competition between firms but 
also extens to ru.les  on  state aids  and the reorganization of state-run monopolies. 
Although there is .no  basic ·contradiction between competition policy and  industrial 
or regional structural policy,  conflicts can arise where  individual Member 
States provide unreasonable assistance to individual industries or firms  or 
improperly attract investment  to individual regions through excessive regional 
aids. The  Gommission''.s  power to control such measures  bites deep  into the internal 
af£ai·rs  of the Member  States •.  In several cases the Member  States are glad to 
have ·the •:Commission  on their side when  trying to resist demands  for assistance 
in ·its own  reg:iJons.  However,  there is frequently a  head-on clash between national 
. governments and the Commission,  so that the Court  of Justice has to be the final 
arbiter. 
Using its powers  to control regional aid schemes,  the Commission has  successfully 
taken action against the excessive assistance given at a  particular time in 
--- several countries.. It has 'worked with the Member  States  on  establishing maximum 
rates of investment aid for the  ce_ntral  regions  of the Community,  and  the Member 
States have  so far been ready to'comply with this. 
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Specific aid arrangements have been developed for the shipbuilding industr.y 
in Europe.  The  Commission has  established a  Community  approach to aids to the 
textile industr.y,  and the admissibility of national measures  of aid is tested 
agRinst the criteria of this approach. 
Considerable progress has already been made  in the reorganization of state-run 
commercial  monopolies.  At  the Commission's  instigation,  most  of these monopolies 
have been wound  up, while those that  remain in business are there only for a 
limi~ed duration.  The  tobacco monopolies  in France and Italy are shortly to be 
dismantled;  they have already been altered to such an extent that manufacturers 
from  other Member  States  can now  enter the French or Italian market  on the same 
terms  as the national manufacturer. 
One  question of European competition policy which remains  to be solved is the 
relationship between state authorities and public enterprise.  The  Member  States 
have an extensive range of possibilities for_distorting competition between 
public and private enterprise.  ~o one will wish to deny the state's right to 
own  and  operate businesses - on the  contrary,  government  involvement  is an 
indispensable facet  of our mixed  economy.  But  for efficiency's sake,  it must 
be  ensured that public enterprise is not  given excessive advantages  over its 
private sector competitors.  Putting this principle of equal treatment  into 
practice is a  thorny problem;  the Member  States will have to exercise good 
jud~ent, while the Community  must  know  what  it is doing and must  act with 
w1thority. 
I 
To  sum  up it can be said that the Community  competition policy has been through 
its baptism by fire.  This is the first time in all economic history that a  major 
area of economic  policy - backed up  by the existence of penalties - has  been 
administered on a  transnational basis and has  been enforced against  industry 
and government.  The  further development,  the ambition,  the quality and the 
viability of this policy will play a  key role in consolidating the Community's 
achievements  and in helping it to prosper. 